GECMUN XIII

BACKGROUND GUIDE

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Addressing the implications of modern drone warfare in current global conflicts

SDG: 9. Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure (9.1, 9.2, 9.4), 16. Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions (16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.6), 17. Partnerships for the Goals (17.6, 17.9, 17.10, 17.16)

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Committee Introduction

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the First Committee of the United National General Assembly. Established in 1945 with the founding of the United National following the end of the Second World War, DISEC was created to provide Member States with a forum to address issues concerning international peace, global security, disarmament, and the regulation of weapons. The devastation caused by two world wars demonstrated the need for international cooperation to prevent armed conflict and reduce the proliferation of increasingly destructive weapons.

DISEC addresses a wide range of issues related to international security, including nuclear disarmament, conventional weapons control, the prevention of the arms race, the regulation of emerging military technologies, terroism, cybersecurity, outer space security, and confidence-building measures between states. As warfare continues to evolve through technological innovation, the committee also uses autonomous and unmanned technologies such as drones.

The primary purpose of DISEC is to engage international cooperation on matters of disarmament and security by providing a platform for discussion, negotiation, and consensus-building among all United Nations Member States. Delegates work together to draft resolutions that recommend policies, promote arms control initiatives, strengthen international legal frameworks, and encourage peaceful solutions to security challenges. While DISEC resolutions are not legally binding, they often influence international norms, guide future negotiations, and serve as the foundation for action by other United Nations bodies.

Throughout its history, DISEC has contributed to numerous international initiatives aimed at reducing the threat posed by weapons. The committee has supported efforts related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), promoted discussions surrounding the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and adopted resolutions addressing small arms and light weapons, transparency in armaments, confidence-building measures, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. More recently, DISEC has expanded its focus to include emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and autonomous weapons systems.

Unlike the United Nations Security Council, DISEC does not possess the authority to impose sanctions or authorize the use of force, nor do any Member States hold veto power within the committee. Instead every Member State has one vote, emphasizing diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and consensus. As a General Assembly committee, DISEC serves as one of the principal forums where the international community can collectively discuss complex security challenges and recommend solutions that promote lasting peace and stability.

This year, delegates will consider the agenda item “Addressing the Implications of Modern Drone Warfare in Current Global Conflicts.” As unmanned aerial systems become increasingly sophisticated and accessible, they continue to reshape the nature of warfare by lowering operational costs, expanding surveillance capabilities, and increasing the precision of military operations. At the same time, their widespread use raises complex questions regarding civilian protection, state sovereignty, accountability under international humanitarian law, these challenges from multiple perspectives and developing practical, balanced solutions that uphold international peace and security.

Agenda Introduction

In today's wars, even standing outside can become a death sentence. Instead of traditional airstrikes or snipers, this newfound fear, lodged deep into civilian populations, stems from the threat of modern drones.

The first recorded military development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) dates all the way back to the first World War; they were initially developed by countries such the United Kingdom and United States in 1917 for the purpose of attacking German targets with early models largely controlled through radio. This development continued during the interwar period, and it is believed that the term "drone" has become the widely used term for such vehicles, deriving the name from such models. Later on drones were also used in multiple conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, where they were used in the process of reconnaissance, launching missiles at targets, and for operations that are psychological, such as dropping leaflets over enemy territories.

However, though modern drone warfare is considered to have developed in the early 2000s, the first signs of a new era of drone weaponization would only arise in the mid-late 2010s, when ISIS in Iraq and Syria began to modify FPV (First Person View) drones to allow the attachment of explosives. Though primitive, this act was incredibly pivotal to the modernization of drone warfare, as it demonstrated how even cheap drones (with the right modifications) could be utilized to drop small explosives and grenades, and deliver the same amount of damage as a larger drone. In wars today, this fact has been taken into account and taken advantage of by several militaries. Such examples include the Russian-Ukraine War, in which both armies are using drones as a cheaper alternative to traditional ranged aerial attacks. This was seen in the development, mass production, and large-scale use of homemade FPV drones dubbed "kamikaze drones," and other models such as the Bayraktar TB2 and the Shahed-136, as they still allowed for direct maneuvering to targets, acting as a cheap alternative to flying missiles.

Since the beginning of 2026, drone attacks have killed 1,272 civilians, injuring 6,871 others in Ukraine, accounted for over 80% of deaths in Sudan, and resulted in a 121% increase in civilian casualties compared to 2025. Coupled with systemically-coordinated operations dubbed the "Human Safari," which target civilians with an aim of driving them out, civilians live in a constant state of both physical pain and psychological fear, unable to step outside to retrieve even basic necessities. Though heavily condemned, military powers currently show no sign of regression on these attacks, even going so far as to target other aspects of daily life, such as energy. Following Operation Epic Fury by the United States and Israel, Iran's military has retaliated through the delivering of Strike Packages, with the combined usage of both drone and other missiles. Such usage of drones are intended for the saturation of enemy air defences, and forcing expensive interception of such drones with much more expensive aerial defense weapons. Such attacks have been targeted at multiple countries, attacking both military and energy infrastructure. The closing of Strait of Hormuz has also contributed to the attacks of ships by drones, causing disruptions to international commercial trade and energy supply.

As the world continues with this era of modern and transformative warfare, drone attacks have undoubtedly become one of the most harmful threats to the safety of civilians, and traditional protective measures are no longer enough. As drones continue to advance with unprecedented military reach and heavier consequences of war, the international community faces urgent questions on regulation, accountability, and the human cost of conflict.

Letter from the Chairs

Dear Esteemed Delegates,

Welcome to GECMUN XIII!

My name is Rachael Lee, and I am honored to be able to serve as your Head Chair for this year's Disarmament and International Security Committee. Now a senior attending Korea International School (Pangyo campus), this is my fourth year involved in Model UN. As a delegate, my MUN journey has been filled with all kinds of moments, with some being the most ecstatic highs, but others being the rockiest lows. To ensure that DISEC is a committee that falls into the former and not the latter, I, with the help of my fellow chairs Jio and Howie, will work my hardest to create an inclusive, fair, and memorable experience. And as a chair, my goal is to make this conference one that is meaningful to each and every one of you. MUN has shown me new ways of looking at the world and the chance to curate a voice, so I hope to extend that same opportunity of growth and purpose by curating an environment that is both invigorating and supportive of your ideas and their development.

My name is Howie Zhang, and it's my absolute pleasure to be able to serve as the Deputy Chair for this year's Disarmament and International Security Committee. I am currently attending North London Collegiate School Jeju as a Junior, and this year would be my sixth year in MUN. This conference would be my 19th conference, and my 5th time chairing. I strongly encourage this conference as a way for delegates to not only debate and help justify their argument and solutions, but more importantly, using GECMUN as a platform for delegates to befriend and connect delegates from different backgrounds and nationalities.

Hello delegates! My name is Jio Kim, and I am a rising senior at Daegu International School. It is my absolute privilege to serve as your Associate Chair for the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) at this conference. Throughout my MUN journey, I have had the opportunity to participate in conferences as both a delegate and a chair, all experiences in which has built my appreciation for diplomacy, collaboration, and thoughtful debate. As your Associate Chair, I hope to foster a welcoming and engaging committee where delegates can freely and confidently express their ideas and to work together to develop innovative solutions.

The three of us are honored to serve as your chairs and wish you the very best of luck in your preparation. Again, we encourage all of you to see GECMUN XIII as a foundation for diplomatic collaboration, but also as an opportunity for your voice and your call to action. Challenge yourself by trying something new, whether it be raising a motion for the first time, or diversifying your research by watching a documentary—every step, no matter how big or small, is a contribution to an increased awareness of the world and towards global citizenship.

We are excited to meet all of you, and feel free to contact us if you have any questions or concerns!

Best regards,

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Key Terms

Autonomous Weapon System (AWS)

A weapon system capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging targets with little or no direct human intervention after activation.

Collateral Damage

Unintentional injury, death, or destruction suffered by civilians or civilian property as a result of military operations.

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS)

Technologies and strategies designed to detect, track, disrupt, or destroy hostile unmanned aerial vehicles.

Disarmament

The reduction or withdrawal of military forces and weapons.

Drone Warfare

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct military operations, including surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and offensive or defensive attacks.

Dual-Use Technology

Technology that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, making its regulation and export more complex.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

The body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict by protecting civilians and limiting the methods and means of warfare.

Precision Strike

A military attack intended to accurately hit a designated target while minimizing unintended damage to civilians and surrounding infrastructure.

Proliferation

The rapid spread or increase of weapons, military technologies, or related materials among states or non-state actors.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Military directives that define the circumstances, conditions, and limitations under which armed forces may use force during military operations.

State Sovereignty

The principle that each state has the exclusive authority to govern its own territory and affairs without external interference.

Targeted Strike

A deliberate military attack directed at a specific individual, group, or military objective using precision-guided weapons or other means.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

An aircraft that operates without a human pilot onboard. UAVs, commonly referred to as drones, may be remotely controlled or operate autonomously using onboard software.

Historical Background

The origin of these sky-maneuvering, pilotless vehicles can be found in the years of and following the First World War. The first test of such a radio-controlled aircraft was in March of 1917 by Britain for its Aerial Target, with the U.S. following shortly after with a test of their own torpedo, referred to as the Kettering Bug, in October of 1918. Despite the fact that neither aircraft was utilized operationally during the war, and rather for simulation, both events are often cited as the kickstart to drone manufacturing. This would prove to be true, with the development and testing of such vehicles sustaining through the inter-war period, and in 1935 Britain would create a model called the DH.82B Queen Bee, from which the term "drone" was coined by the U.S. Navy as they adopted a similar device. As the drone provided immense benefits, namely its efficiency in range and light weight due to the lack of a need for a crew, life support, or pilot safety systems, drones continued to evolve and advance and would be introduced into warfare only two decades later.

In 1939, the outbreak of World War II also came with the mass production and extension of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) experiments into combat. These drones can be sorted into two main types, with the first being target drones and the second being an early version of what today's look like—guided bombs. For target drones, Reginald Denny had developed the Radioplane OQ-2 in the U.S., which would become the first model to be mass-produced in a military. His next, the OQ-3, which improved the OQ-2's maximum speed and durability with replaced propellers, would become the most commonly used target drone by the U.S., resulting in the production of over 9,400 of them throughout the war. Both models were utilized for the purpose of training, albeit for different operations, and were deployed on a large scale across various branches of the military. Then, for guided bombs, Germany's V-1 Flying Bomb, also known as the "Doodlebug," would become the first example of this, as an early operational cruise missile that could be armed with a 1,870 pound explosive. In automated warfare, this was considered a milestone, as drones were considered cheap and were pilotless in contrast to conventional bombers and the harms that they faced. Another such model would arise from the Anvil and Aphrodite projects of the U.S., where Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses and Consolidated B-24s would be filled with around 20,000 pounds of explosives and were primarily flown into heavy defense. Furthermore, though the production of around 5,000 kamikaze drones were planned, the project was canceled due to the minimal damage that it caused, revealing that despite the various advancements in drone technology, the vehicle still lacked much of the capability it needed for it to be weaponized.

However, the late 1950s would mark a shift in the utilization of drones. Though still being considered and developed for warfare, UAVs now had the added function of surveillance. During conflicts like the Cold War, Vietnam War, Yugoslav Wars, and the Yom Kippur War, such reconnaissance vehicles would be fitted with film cameras and would gather images from regions like China and North Vietnam, with a reported estimate of 34,000 operational surveillance missions carried out during this time. By the early 1980s, drones like the AQM-34 Ryan Firebee, would evolve to be used for high-threat stealth missions and as a target drone for surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles simultaneously, albeit without the ability to launch weapons, leading to the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper being developed with such launching mechanisms, even being equipped with lasers and electronic transmitters. Additionally, during the Yom Kippur and Lebanon Wars, drones would be used by Israel in other ways, dropping leaflets, deploying real-time video-streams, or acting as decoys in combat.

In 2001, the first targeted drone strike occurred. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the West rapidly expanded use of UAVs, namely the Predator and Reaper due to its reconnaissance and combat abilities, and the U.S. would fit both with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, and this method would be used in a later attempt to kill Osama Bin Laden. Drones would only continue to be used in the same manner, with six targets killed in 2002 on suspicion of threat to security in Yemen, and even more continuing to be deployed to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia. The estimated number of strikes within those countries between 2004-2013 would be recorded to be 455, resulting in 4,061 civilian and combatant deaths, raising questions and controversy over their unethical use.

In some ways, this normalization of drones within warfare can be seen as having minimized casualty, with less need for ground operations and risk in surveillance missions. It also gives militaries a way of advancing their airborne capabilities at a relatively low cost, with notable producers being Iran, Russia, Israel, Ukraine, and Turkey in recent years. However, with drones like First-Person View (FPV) and kamikaze drones becoming commonplace amongst not just military, but also militias, insurgent and terrorist groups, drone warfare not only lacks a legal mechanism for accountability but has been increasingly used for targeted killings. Civilians have reported developing psychological trauma due to persistent UAV presence, and drone operators become increasingly detached from the tangible harms of the drones themselves. Some drones even contain artificial intelligence systems to counter electronic warfare and signal jamming, and have the ability to take control and strike a target without a human operator. With this detachment, and a 4000% increase in drone-related attacks globally, drones have become emotionally convenient and the spearhead of frontline engagement, according to United Nations (UN) humanitarian reports. This is exemplified by recent conflicts, like the Ukraine-Russia war and the Iran-U.S. war, where kamikaze drones have been a vital factor of both defense and offense.

Looking forward, despite the clear breach of humanitarian law, drone warfare remains relatively unregulated and unresponded to, and instead continues to advance and fundamentally alter modern military dynamics and its harms.

Current State of Affairs

On February 28th 2026, The United States led Operation Epic Fury, a military operation in hopes to eliminate Iran's military sights. The United States official statement claimed it a success, utilizing the LUCAS one way attack drones, as well as the MQ-9 Surveillance and Attack drones. Following this operation, the Iranian military retaliated with their own strike package, a form of aerial attack involving ballistic missiles and large quantities of drones to overwhelm enemy aerial defence systems. Numerous Shahed Drones are utilized in their operations to target US military stations in the gulf states. As well as military targets, Iran also targets energy infrastructure as well as transportation infrastructure. Iranian attacks on the Ras Laffen gas complex in Qatar has been estimated to eliminate 17% of the world's Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) resource. As can be seen, the prevalence of drones in modern warfare have not only been a warfare tactic, but also threatened humanitarian resources.

Following this is also the substantial increase in investment countries have committed towards drone technology, the building of Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones by major global powers such as Russia, China and the United States. Drone warfare can be viewed to be significantly more beneficial towards the offensive side due to the cost-exchange ratio. The construction and unleashing of attack drones can be a fraction of the cost it takes for the defending side to intercept it. Current cost of the Shahed drone, the common model used by Iran, is valued at $20,000 to $50,000 and quick to manufacture. While the common interception missile used by the United States, the Sea Viper is valued at more than $1,000,000 each as well as taking much more time to produce, making it economically invalid to prolong such exchanges for the defending side. As such major super powers, including the United States have been investing heavily into the development of Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems, utilizing radar technology to identify enemy drones, then proceed to eliminate the threat through either a Soft Kill, such as jamming or a Hard Kill, such as anti-drone interceptors.

The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) subsequently further introduces complexity into the morality of drone warfare. The introduction of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) into drones allow them to track enemy personnel and execute killing procedures without the supervision and confirmation of a human. Such examples can be seen in the Russian-Ukrainian war, where Ukrainian Hornet drones are equipped with AI targeting systems trained with previous footage data of Russian military targets. There are currently no direct international treaties regarding the usage and regulation of LAWS. The challenge of differentiating combatant from non combatant must be addressed by the international community.

The acquisition of military drones by Non-State Actors has also been a growing issue among the international community. In July, 2026, according to Saudi Arabia officials, the country intercepted 14 combat drones, which it deemed to be from Houthis in Yemen and Pro-Iran groups in Iraq. Modifications of commercial drones have allowed armed Non-State Actors to participate towards distant attacks. Such practices would be much more difficult for international and domestic organizations to track, as well as the growing availability of commercial drones. This therefore poses another challenge in which the international community must face.

Stances of Parties

Australia

Under its National Defense Strategy and AUKUS agreements, Australia has prioritized long-range UAV systems alongside maritime drone strategy. This mainly stems as a result of deterrence or security threat to its borders within the Indo-Pacific region, and the nation has even been a strong investor in more advanced autonomous projects, with one notable example being the MQ-28A Ghost Bat, an AI assistant to such unmanned aircrafts, though it does maintain a strict standard of all lethal engagements being under human control. Australia highly emphasizes a push for "responsible military innovation," considering such investments and discussion for pro-policies as a necessary mechanism against rising regional power projection. It is one of the first countries to apply drone warfare framework onto undersea vehicles as well, an implication for the possible expansion of UAVs and how they could be further utilized within various landscapes.

Brazil

Contrary to most countries, Brazil approaches drone warfare with a mix of diplomacy, strategy, and national sovereignty. Brazil is a strong advocate for a legally binding international treaty that would restrict the use of LAWS as an active participant in the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts. Additionally, the country has co-sponsored UN GA resolutions pertaining to a similar framework, calling consistently for regulatory mechanisms, especially on the involvement of artificial intelligence. For instance, Brazil has stated that "the authority to make decisions about lethal force should always remain with human beings, particularly in life-and-death scenarios," highlighting that the lack of regulation surrounding algorithmic warfare could be a violation of the International Humanitarian Law. However, Brazil does not directly call for the eradication of drone warfare, continuing to develop non-lethal, supervised technology primarily for defense and border monitoring. The nation has even invested in domestic research regarding drone defense development, managing a balance between local security needs and surveillance priorities with international regulations.

Canada

In approaching drone warfare, Canada has also pushed for a balanced strategy. On one hand, Canada has invested in drone warfare and even updated its defense procurement policy to include the acquisition of specialized long-ranged UAV systems to protect and surveil its Arctic borders. On the other hand, the nation still strongly advocated for international ethnical norms regarding artificial intelligence within warfare, particularly emphasizing responsibility and accountability. Moreover, the nation faces strong debate regarding the ethical limits of armed drone exports and procurement as it continues to strongly invest in the development of drone warfare, especially considering its past commitments to human rights-centered policy, even against the general desires of NATO.

China

China views drones as important dual-use technologies that contribute to national security, economic development, and technological innovation. As one of the world's largest manufacturers and exporters of UAVs, Beijing supports international regulation through multilateral dialogue but opposes unilateral sanctions and export restrictions imposed outside the UN framework. Chinese officials maintain that the country has not supplied lethal military aid to parties involved in the war in Ukraine and have repeatedly called for peaceful negotiations while respecting state sovereignty.

Nevertheless, Western governments have accused Chinese companies of providing dual-use components that indirectly support Russia's military industry, making China's position highly controversial among the nations. In DISEC, China would likely defend states' rights to develop drone technology while promoting international cooperation instead of punitive sanctions.

Egypt

Egypt views drone technology as an important component of counterterrorism operations, border security, and military modernization. Due to its strategic location connecting Africa and the Middle East, Egypt has invested in UAV capabilities for surveillance and defense purposes, particularly in combating military groups in the Sinai Peninsula and securing its borders. Egypt has also expanded military cooperation with countries such as China and France to acquire advanced defense technologies, including unmanned systems. However, Egypt's growing military drone capabilities have raised discussions regarding transparency, arms procurement, and the balance between national security and humanitarian concerns. Egyptian officials argue that strengthening military technology is necessary to combat terrorism protect national sovereignty. In DISEC, Egypt would likely support increased international cooperation against terrorist organizations using drones, responsible arms transfers, and stronger regulation of non-state actors while maintaining states' rights to develop defensive capabilities.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia's viewpoint on drone technology for warfare relies on a basis of state sovereignty, affected by factors such as military survival and domestically occurring counter-insurgency operations. Currently, primarily a result of the northern Tigray conflict but also affected by internal military strategy, Ethiopia has expanded its acquisition of combat UAVs. Such models include the Turkish Bayraktar TB2s, Iranian Mohajer-6s, Chinese Wing Loong systems, and more. This rapid increase has not only allowed Ethiopia to gain a significant standing in early drone trade, but has also allowed the country to utilize drones as a mechanism of control against rebel groups. Moreover, Ethiopia has strongly emphasized the further development of precision pertaining to UAVs, in order to protect non-state combatants and civilians, essentially aiming for high reward and little risk. However, despite this, Ethiopia has faced criticism from human right organizations and UN special reports due to high documentation of drone strike casualties in civilian-populated areas, and has been called to account for a lack of transparency and increased civilian safeguards when developing internal drone operations.

France

France views drone technology as a crucial component of modern military operations while emphasizing the importance of maintaining human control over the use of force. As a major NATo and European Union defense actor, France has invested in reconnaissance and combat UAVs to strengthen intelligence capabilities and support overseas military operations, particularly in counterterrorism missions in the Sahel region. France has also supported discussions surrounding responsible regulation of autonomous weapons through the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, France faces debate regarding the balance between maintaining technological superiority and preventing uncontrolled proliferation of advanced military systems. French officials have argued that emerging technologies must remain subject to international humanitarian law and ethical standards. In DISEC, France would likely support stronger international frameworks for drone regulation, responsible exports, and maintaining meaningful human oversight in autonomous weapons systems.

Germany

Germany approaches drone warfare with a cautious balance between military modernization and humanitarian responsibility. Historically hesitant to develop armed UAV capabilities due to concerns regarding civilian casualties and accountability, Germany had increasingly recognized the strategic importance of drones following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The German government has expanded investment in unmanned systems, including reconnaissance drones and counter-drone technologies, while maintaining that military operations must follow international humanitarian law. Germany has also supported international discussions on regulating autonomous weapons and ensuring meaningful human control over lethal systems. Critics argue that Germany's increasing reliance on military technology risks contributing to global arms competition, while supporters argue that modern defense requires adaptation to new threats. In DISEC, Germany would likely advocate for strict international regulations, transparency measures, and responsible drone development rather than complete prohibition.

India

India views drones as increasingly essential for protecting its borders, combating terrorism, and modernizing its armed forces. Following the large-scale drone clashes with Pakistan in 2025, new Delhi significantly expanded investment in domestic drone production under the "Make in India" initiative to reduce dependence on imported technology. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has repeatedly emphasized strengthening India's self-reliance in defense manufacturing, while the government has announced major financial incentives for UAV development. Nevertheless, India's expanding drone capabilities have fueled concerns over an emerging arms race with Pakistan and the increasing militarization of South Asia. In DISEC, India would likely support responsible drone development, stronger counter-drone cooperation, and international regulations that preserve states' legitimate right to self-defense.

Indonesia

Indonesia has taken a strong stance against the unlawful usage of drones in warfare, especially regarding the integration of Artificial Intelligence technologies into such weapons. It has emphasized the importance of clarifying subjective usage in terms of AI usage such as "meaningful human control", and agreeing on the extent of using such terms. Indonesia calls for the responsibility of AI researchers and companies to ensure the ethical usage and the involvement of human control in their operations, as well as highlighting the risk involved in their technologies. Indonesia supports the equal voice of all nations regarding the shaping of rules and norms regarding AI usage in autonomous weapons.

Iran

Iran considers military drones a cornerstone of its asymmetric defense strategy, allowing it to strengthen deterrence despite decades of international sanctions. Tehran has developed an extensive domestic UAV industry, producing systems such as the Shahed-136, and argues that its drone program serves legitimate national defense purposes. Iranian leaders have consistently rejected accusations that they destabilize the region, instead criticizing Western military intervention and sanctions. However, Iran's transfer of drones to Russia and armed groups across the Middle East has prompted additional sanctions from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, making its drone program one of the most controversial in the international community. In DISEC, Iran would likely oppose unilateral sanctions, defense state sovereignty in military development, and advocate regulations that apply equally to all nations.

Israel

Israel views drones as indispensable to its national security strategy, using them extensively for intelligence, surveillance, precision strikes, and counterterrorism operations. As one of the world's leading UAV developers and exporters, Israel has produced systems such as the Heron and Hermes, which have been exported globally. Israeli officials argue that drones improve precision and reduce risks to military personnel while exercising the state's right to self-defense against groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. However, drone operations during conflicts in Gaza have generated international criticism over civilian casualties and alleged violations of international humanitarian law. This debate has intensified discussions surrounding proportionality, accountability, and arms exports. In DISEC, Israel would likely oppose broad restrictions on military drones while supporting responsible use, technological innovation, and every state's right to defend itself against security threats.

Japan

Japan views drones as an increasingly important tool for national defense, particularly in response to rising security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. Facing challenges related to China's growing military capabilities and North Korea's missile development, Japan has expanded investment in unmanned systems for surveillance, maritime security, and defense operations. Japan's Ministry of Defense has emphasized the importance of integrating advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and autonomous systems while maintaining compliance with international law. However, Japan's increasing military modernization has generated debate due to its historical pacifist constitution and concerns over regional arms competition. Supporters argue that drones provide cost-effective defensive capabilities, while critics fear they may accelerate militarization in East Asia. In DISEC, Japan would likely support defensive drone applications, stronger transparency measures and international cooperation on regulating autonomous weapons.

Mexico

Similarly to Brazil, Mexico has also supported and called for global restrictions on drone warfare and general autonomous weapons systems while balancing domestic development of non-lethal and counter UAV and drone technology. Mexico holds this leverage more so for crime nationally, utilizing such systems to combat dominant organized crime. From an objective viewpoint, Mexico's stance could be seen as contradictory, as the nation has not only internationally co-sponsored UN GA resolutions advocating for limitations on such autonomous warfare, but has simultaneously signed defense agreements with international partners to acquire advanced drone and counter-drone systems. When assessing Mexico's stance, countries should consider Mexico's purpose in purchasing such drones (which is to control and mitigate illicit drone use by cartels and general organized crime), as they mainly serve as a counter response to already weaponized FPV explosives.

Nigeria

Nigeria views drone technology primarily as a tool for counterterrorism, intelligence gathering and national security. Facing threats from groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa province (ISWAP), Nigeria has increasingly adopted UAVs for surveillance, reconnaissance, and military operations. The Nigerian government has emphasized the importance of technological modernization to improve its ability to monitor large territories and respond to security threats. However, the use of drones in counterterrorism operations has raised concerns regarding civilian casualties, transparency and accountability. Nigeria also faces challenges related to preventing armed groups from obtaining commercial drones that can be modified for hostile purposes. In DISEC, Nigeria would likely advocate for greater international assistance in developing defensive drone

capabilities, stronger controls preventing terrorist access to UAV technology and increased cooperation between states to combat the misuse of drones by non-state actors.

North Korea

North Korea views drones as an affordable asymmetric capability that allows it to challenge technologically superior adversaries such as south orea and the united states. Despite economic limitations and international sanctions, Pyongyang had invested in unmanned aerial systems for surveillance, reconnaissance, and potential offensive operations North Korean drone incursions into South Korea airspace in 2022 demonstrated the country's continued interest in UAV development and highlighted vulnerabilities in regional air defenses. The international community had expressed concern that North Korea's drone advancement could contribute to instability and threaten civilian security. However, North Korea argues that its military development is necessary for national sovereignty and deterrence against foreign threats. In DISEC, North Korea would likely oppose restrictions targeting its military programs, emphasize the principle of self-defense, and criticize the military activities of the United States and its allies.

Pakistan

Pakistan views drones as an important means of safeguarding national sovereignty while maintaining strategic balance with India. Islamabad has expanded cooperation with China and Tukiye to strengthen domestic drone production and increasingly relied on UAVs for border surveillance and military deterrence. During the 2025 India- Pakistan conflict, Pakistan employed domestically produced and imported drones while accusing India of violating its sovereignty through cross-border drone operations. Although Pakistani officials argue that drone capabilities are necessary for national defense, regional analysts warn that growing UAV competition between the two nuclear-armed states could increase the risk of accidental escalation. In DISEC, Pakistan would likely advocate stronger international oversight of military drone use while defending every states; right to develop defensive technologies and protect its territorial integrity.

Poland

As part of NATO's Eastern flank, Poland primarily views drone warfare as counter-drone defense to combat national security concerns. Nationally, Poland has been a heavy investor in domestic drone munitions, such as WB Group's Warmate, and has been strongly involved in multi-nation defense coalitions, such as the European "E5" with France, Germany, the U.K., and Italy, in order to prioritize low cost, a border "drone wall," and effective military strategies. This seemingly urgent approach mainly stems as a result of repeated airspace violations (with over 20 cases documented) that have entered the territory due to the neighboring Russia-Ukraine war. Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has highly emphasized the necessity of joint drone defense development as a response to such violations, stating that "the cost of the threats [should match] the cost of defense." Poland has not only been one of the fastest adapting countries to integrate drone warfare, but has also been one of the first to raise questions about airspace sovereignty and reliance on autonomous defensive platforms.

Qatar

Qatar approaches drone warfare primarily from the perspective of national defense, regional stability, and protection against emerging security threats. As a smaller Gulf state surrounded by larger regional powers, Qatar has invested in advanced surveillance and defense technologies, including unmanned systems, to strengthen intelligence capabilities and territorial security. Qatar has also played a diplomatic role in regional conflicts by emphasizing meditation and dialogue rather than

military escalation. However, the increasing militarization of Gulf states through drone acquisition has contributed to concerns about a regional arms competition and the possibility of drones being used by non-state actors. Qatar has generally supported international cooperation and collective security mechanisms through organizations such as the United Nations and Gulf Cooperation Council. In DISEC, Qatar would likely advocate for responsible drone transfers, stronger international monitoring of UAV proliferation, and diplomatic solutions that reduce tensions while recognizing states' legitimate security concerns.

Russian Federation

Russia considers drones an integral part of modern military operations and argues that their use is a legitimate exercise of its right to national defense. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has significantly expanded domestic drone production while employing long-range strike drones and FPV drones to target military infrastructure and logistics. Russian officials have consistently criticized Western military aid to Ukraine, claiming it prolongs the conflict, while defending their own drone operations as lawful military actions, However, repeated attacks on civilian infrastructure have prompted widespread international condemnation and accusations of violating international humanitarian law. In DISEC, Russia would likely oppose restrictions that limit national military capabilities while supporting regulations that apply equally to all states without political bias.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia views drone technology primarily through the lens of national security, territorial defense, and protection of critical infrastructure. As a country that has experienced repeated drone and missile attacks against military sites, oil facilities, and civilian areas, Saudi Arabia has emphasized the need for stronger counter-drone capabilities and international accountability for actors that use UAVs against Sovereign states. A major example was the 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities, which temporarily disrupted global energy markets and increased international concern over the vulnerability of infrastructure to low-cost drone attacks. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has invested in acquiring and developing advanced UAV systems to strengthen its military capabilities. Critics have raised concerns regarding the country's use of air power during the Yemen conflict and the humanitarian consequences of military operations. In DISEC, Saudi Arabia would likely advocate for stronger protections against unauthorized drone attacks, improved air defense cooperation and regulations targeting the misuse of UAV technology.

Singapore

Singapore believes that the implementation of artificial intelligent technology such as drones should be undertaken in a responsible manner. It recognizes the benefits that such drones and artificial intelligent powered systems can have, however it also calls such technologies to follow international law and international humanitarian law. Singapore has worked previously with international organizations such as The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), addressing the usage of Artificial Intelligence in the defence sector. Overall, Singapore is not heavily restricted for the usage of drones and automated weapons in warfare but rather advocates for responsibility and accordance with international law when utilizing such weapons.

South Africa

South Africa has maintained a stance against the usage of drone warfare that causes excessive harm or is indiscriminate, it has been a supporting member of past UN solutions regarding Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). It has placed emphasis on the discussions and communications of the Group of Government Expert (GGE), hoping to use such entities to address

concerns of the usage of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). South Africa. Furthermore, South African parliamentary discussions, taking place during the Inter-parliamentary Union Assembly taking place in Angola, have emphasized the importance of human control over combat weapons. It calls for the creation of legally binding instruments with clear defined boundaries regarding autonomous weapons and Artificial Intelligence and following the principles of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, South Africa values international cooperation and diplomatic efforts in order to address the issue on an international scale

South Korea

South Korea views drone technology as a critical component of national defense due to its unique security environment with North Korea. Following several North Korean drone incursions into South Korean airspace, Seoul had accelerated the development of domestic UA capabilities, including reconnaissance drones, counter-drone systems, and AI-enabled defense technologies. The South Korean government had promoted the creation of a dedicated drone command and increased investment in unmanned systems as part of military modernization efforts, However, the expansion of drone capabilities on the Korean Peninsula has raised concerns about escalation and the possibility of miscalculation between two heavily militarized states, South Korea argues that these systems are primarily defensive and necessary for deterrence. In DISEC, South Korea would likely support stronger counter-drone cooperation, responsible military innovation, and international efforts to prevent unauthorized drone attacks.

Switzerland

Considering its traditional neutrality and taking into account its depositary power of the Geneva Conventions, Switzerland primarily prioritizes the humanitarian aspect of drone warfare. For instance, Switzerland has actively co-drafted multiple multilateral statements at UN CCW conferences in Geneva, pushing for humanitarian legal frameworks, strict regulation and mandates, specifically emphasizing the need for clear legal definition, distinction, and limits. Additionally, the country mainly aligns itself with cross-regional partners, especially in the development of a legally binding framework that fully complies with existing International Humanitarian Law. However, despite such a strong stance on drone warfare, Switzerland still produces dual-use drone technology, specifically for surveillance, and faces criticism on its strict international standards and its contrasting economic interests.

Turkiye

Turkiye occupies a unique position in the debate as both a NATO member and one of the world's leading drone manufacturers. Through companies such as Baykar, Turkiye has exported Bayraktar TB2 drones to numerous countries, including Ukraine, while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic relations with Russia and serving as a mediator in regional conflicts. Turkish officials argue that drones strengthen national defense, improve battlefield precision, and support international security partnerships. However, Tukiye's expanding drone exports have also raised concerns regarding arms proliferation and the potential use of UAVs in prolonged regional conflicts. In DISEC, Turkiye would likely advocate for responsible international export standards while opposing excessive restrictions that could hinder legitimate defense cooperation or technological innovation.

Ukraine

Ukraine views drones as essential to defending its sovereignty against Russia's full-scale invasion and has rapidly expanded domestic UAV production while receiving substantial military assistance from Western allies. Ukrainian forces use drones for reconnaissance, artillery coordination,

logistics, and precision strikes, arguing that these systems allow a smaller military to effectively defend itself. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly emphasized that expanding drone production is critical to Ukraine's defense strategy. While Ukraine maintains that its drone operations fall under the right to self-defense established in Article 51 of the UN Charter, long-range strikes inside Russian territory remain controversial internationally. In DISEC, Ukraine would likely support increased military assistance, stronger accountability for attacks on civilians, and international cooperation to prevent the misuse of drone technology.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The United Arab Emirates views drones as a strategic technology that enhances military capabilities, border security and regional influence. The UAE has become one of the Middle East's largest importers and operators of unmanned aerial systems, acquiring drones for surveillance, intelligence gathering, and military operations. The country has also developed domestic defense industries and promoted technological innovation through initiatives focused on artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. However, the UAE's use and export of drone technology has faced international scrutiny, particularly regarding its involvement in conflicts such as Libya and Yemen, where armed UAVs have influenced battlefield dynamics and raised concerns about accountability, Emirati officials argue that drones are legitimate defensive tools and necessary for protecting national interests in a volatile region. In DISEC, the UAe would likely support responsible drone development, stronger export regulations, and international cooperation against terrorist groups using UAVs while maintaining its right to modernize its defense capabilities.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom supports responsible military use of drones while emphasizing compliance with international humanitarian law, transparency, and export controls. As a NATO member, Britain has invested heavily in unmanned systems through its Defense Drone Strategy, viewing UAVs as essential to future military operations and allied security. At the same time, London has suspended certain export licenses for military equipment where there is a clear risk of violating international humanitarian law, including restrictions related to conflicts in the Middle East. This balanced approach reflects the UK's effort to strengthen national security while promoting accountability in arms transfers. In DISEC, the United Kingdom would likely advocate for international norms governing drone warfare, responsible exports, and stronger oversight of emerging military technologies.

United States

The United States considers drones an essential component of modern warfare, emphasizing their effectiveness in intelligence gathering, counterterrorism, and precision strikes while maintaining that their use should comply with international humanitarian law. Since the early 2000s, the U.S. has conducted UAV operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia and has become one of Ukraine's largest suppliers of reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, and counter-drone systems following Russia's invasion. Former President Joe Biden pledged to support Ukraine "for as long as it takes," reflecting continued U.S. commitment to allied defense. However, American drone strikes have also drawn criticism from human rights organizations over civilian casualties and transparency. In DISEC, the United States could likely advocate for responsible drone use, stronger export control, and greater international accountability for states that misuse unmanned systems.

Possible Solutions

Strengthening International Legal Terminology and Foundations

Current international treaties such as the CCW has limited coverage over certain weapon types such as LAWS, however, delegates may wish to further enhance current regulations regarding the usage of drone warfare in armed conflict. Treaties or solutions are recommended to abide by international law and international humanitarian law. Certain aspects that could be included could be regarding the usage of drone warfare by Non State Actors such as armed groups or terrorist groups. But delegates should also consider the incorporation of other Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO), and governmental entities which possess the power and authority to act upon potential violations of international regulations. Furthermore, delegates can approach previously vague definitions and terminologies, attempting to place concrete boundaries on such terminologies in their resolutions.

The monitoring and regulation of private sector artificial intelligence technologies.

Currently, the development of automatic tracking and recognition technologies are mostly conducted under private companies with examples such as Anduril. Such progression of artificial intelligence technology could have negative and dangerous consequences if not monitored, with the possibility of being possessed by dangerous armed groups. Therefore delegates may approach this problem with the establishment of monitoring and testing systems upon the private sector. The creation of UN approved standards of new technologies used in drones, with mandatory testing durations for new technologies before implemented to comply with such standards before being permitted to be used in combat. However such approaches have to be taken in caution, taking into consideration the limited authority that UN organizations usually have, delegates would need to negotiate ways in order to cooperate with national governmental entities to execute such solutions.

Incorporation of Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

The GGE is currently a group of nominated experts chosen by the UN in order to research particular international issues offering recommendations. Delegates may choose to utilize such human resources in their resolutions to support other solutions and to assist in the creation of previously mentioned solutions such as international standards regarding drone warfare, as well as the interpretation of terms and definitions regarding treaties and international humanitarian law. Delegates may also want to increase the current roles of the GGE, potentially creating annual audits upon member countries that are developing drone warfare or are currently utilizing such technologies in current combats to ensure the correct and lawful usage of drones in warfare. However, such solutions have the issue concerning the country's sovereignty and the obtaining of their given approval to conduct such audits, therefore such aspects must be taken into consideration when implementing such solutions.

Questions to Consider

1. How should drone warfare be defined within International Humanitarian Law?
    a. Should there be a legal punishment for war crime carried out through homemade drones?
    b. Should the sale of drones be classified as sale of weaponry?
    c. What does this imply for other UAVs?
2. To what extent should drones be accounted for as surveillance technology, and if your country already utilizes such technology (e.g. facial recognition, artificial intelligence), would you advocate for the inclusion of drones within that categorization?
3. Can drone warfare be considered a possible mechanism to reduce technological advantages within modern weaponry, and if so, how important would your country value the development and usage of it?
4. How can the psychological, economic, and physical impact of drone warfare on a targeted population be measured, and what frameworks of accountability can be used to redress such harms?
5. Is it unethical for militaries to intimidate civilian-populated areas using FPV drones?
    a. Should the judgement or actions of artificial intelligence be considered or held accountable if the system happens to target one such area?
    b. If a non-military target is injured due to a fault within artificial intelligence systems, who should be held accountable?
    c. If artificial intelligence is utilized, how can bias be minimized?
6. Considering existing weaponry supplies, would your country view drone warfare as a form of trade, and would it be a reliable source of economic growth?
7. How should drones be handled in terms of territory?
    a. Would a cross-border strike be a violation of borders?
    b. Should drones be handled the same way other aerial vehicles are?
8. Would a lack of direct physical risk to your country's military make your country more or less likely to engage or be involved in wars/conflicts?
9. How does drone warfare give rise to electronic warfare, and what implications does that hold for the dynamic of future conflicts?
10. Is drone warfare necessary for modern conflict? If so, why, and what trade-offs exist between drone warfare and other rising forms of weaponry?

As drone warfare rises as a new and transformative part of modern conflicts, delegates should consider these questions as they are developing both a comprehensive understanding of the issue and a framework of effective solutions targeting root causes or consequences.

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