



Background Guide

The Supreme People's Assembly: The Spring of Pyongyang

1 | Responding locally and internationally to a North Korean military coup

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Committee Introduction

Delegates and Comrades of The Supreme People's Assembly,

Greetings. North Korea's legislative branch, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA, Korean: 최고인민회의), is the only entity that governs the nation and has the most authority among the other branches of government. The SPA is in charge of making legislation, directing both foreign and domestic policy, and supervising the execution of governmental orders.

The SPA is called to discuss a broad range of topics, with a primary emphasis on foreign affairs, internal affairs, and national security. North Korea has historically been under the absolute control of the Kim Family (AKA Baekdu Bloodline), so the SPA and its roles have only been procedural and for show. However, with the coup happening, the SPA is crucial for North Korea's future, as it is where all of the powerful political and military officials of North Korea gather.

Simply put, Kim Jong Un has temporarily lost his control power, and nobody in North Korea has absolute ruling power over anyone else. Please refer to the agenda introduction and historical background for further information and logistics. You can also easily find YouTube videos of North Korean news coverage of entire SPA meetings. Below is an example:

<https://youtu.be/DiBVHxUieOk?si=NCMraQ5-Aigx2vbA>

The committee will follow standard MUN crisis procedures. Please use the power that your role has to send creative private directives and collaborate with other delegates to make public directives on issues we must vote on as a whole committee. Since the agenda involves a coup, you are more than welcome to attempt attacks/assassinations, run investigations, request trials, or anything you can think of.

More information on delegate stances is available in the "Stances of Parties" section, but the committee is generally divided into three subcommittees: the coup forces, pro-Kim (anti-coup) forces, and international guests. The coup forces, except Kim Han Sol, are North Korean generals who want to overthrow Kim and initiate a war to reunify with the South (communize the peninsula). The anti-coup forces want to continue the absolute rule of the Baekdu Bloodline. The international guests each have their own goals– they all want to minimize damage to their countries. All delegates (comrades) will have to respond to pressing crisis updates which may involve unstable public opinion, assassinations, attacks, terror, and more.

Please conduct sufficient research on North Korea and make sure to ask any questions you have.

Agenda Introduction

“Even my close friend, someone I trusted, one who shared my bread, has turned against me.”

- Psalms 41:9-10

It is the year 2026.

North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has been under the dictatorship of the Kim family, also known as the “Baekdu Bloodline”: Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and currently Kim Jong-Un. It is known to most of the world that North Korea is very restrictive of its people’s exposure to outside influence and that everyone is educated (brainwashed) to respect the Kim regime. However, reliable intelligence services across the globe have reported that high-ranking military officers (i.e. generals) have been dissatisfied with Kim’s rule.

Such dissatisfaction comes from Kim’s tyrannical strategies. To keep himself in absolute rule, he has never been hesitant to execute generals and high officials, even some members of the Baekdu Bloodline. Put yourself in the shoes of a North Korean four-star general. You have thousands of troops and artillery under your direct command— at any moment, you can take over and become the supreme leader.

This has become a reality, as Jong Kyong Thaek, Commander of the General Political Bureau, used his troops to kidnap Kim Jong-Un. Kim Jong-Un is the supreme leader of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and therefore, by definition, also the Korean People’s Army (KPA). However, Jong Kyong Thaek has more direct control of the KPA– in a democratic country, Kim would be president and Jong would be the minister/secretary of defense. Jong aims to gain control of the WPK and ultimately North Korea.

More details are to be mentioned in the historical background, but the unique structure of the WPK is worth mentioning. By law, the WPK is the only political party in North Korea, and any other parties are considered terrorist groups. The KPA is technically the militant branch of the WPK, but since the WPK is the only party in North Korea, the KPA is often referred to as the North Korean Military. With the current coup, the KPA is divided– units under the command of generals in the coup bloc are on one side and special units under the direct command of Kim Jong-Un and the Ministry of State Security are on the other side.

The collective goal of the committee is to minimize harms. This is a very vague goal, but each subcommittee and each bloc has drastically different goals. Please be creative and innovative with your moves– the committee is running in crisis format and there are no right or wrong answers.

Letter from the Chairs

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to GECMUN XI's Fictional Committee!

My name is Tommy, a senior at Daegu International School, and I am excited to serve as head chair of the Supreme People's Assembly. GECMUN XI will be my last MUN conference as a high school student, so I will surely make this conference meaningful for everyone reading this guide. Outside of MUN, I lead my school's computer science team and student council. Outside of school, I have a strong passion for baseball; I am a huge fan of the Samsung Lions and the Philadelphia Phillies. I spend the rest of my time playing the drums for my rock band, cooking expensive cuts of meat, and lifting weights. If you have any questions or want to talk about baseball, please do not hesitate to contact me.

My name is Annie, the deputy chair of the committee, and I am a junior at Daegu International School. Throughout my three years at MUN, I have tackled various positions as a delegate and chair in numerous conferences, and I am overjoyed to chair the Supreme People's Assembly! In school, I am an active member of the economics club, debate club, student council, and school newspaper. I also enjoy playing sports, traveling, watching anime, and hanging out with friends and family! I hope delegates will share unique perspectives and make connections at the conference. Please feel free to reach out with any questions!

My name is Aaron and I am a senior at Daegu International School. I am thrilled to serve as the associate chair for this year's GECMUN. This will be my fourth and last year of MUN as a high schooler, and I will try my very best to provide delegates with the necessary resources for an engaging conference. In school, I am part of the volleyball and soccer team as well as various student clubs. Outside of school, I play the clarinet, watch movies, and listen to music. I look forward to meet everyone at the conference and see fruitful cooperation. If you have any questions, feel free to drop a message and I will be happy to help.

One final note: the background guides will be finalized in December 2024, but with the rapidly changing political events in Korea, some roles may be outdated or inconsistent by the conference date. We will try to make clarifications prior to the conference, but otherwise, please assume everything on the background guide is correct. See you all in March!

Most warmly,

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Aaron Shin | Associate Chair | 2025aaronshin@dis.sc.kr

Key Terms

Coup d'etat (coup)

A sudden, violent, and unlawful seizure of power from a government.

Baekdu Bloodline

A phrase used to represent North Korea's royal (ruling) family– Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong-Un, and other relatives.

Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON)

Alert state used by the Korean military and the United States military. The United States does not release DEFCON status to the public, but the Korean government does. Here are the five DEFCON levels:

- DEFCON 5- No risk of war
- DEFCON 4- Existence of an opponent, low risk of war (Current status in South Korea)
- DEFCON 3- Preparation for war, wartime operational control is given to the Combined Forces Command
- DEFCON 2- expedited preparation for war
- DEFCON 1- war

Pyongyang

The capital city of North Korea. Kim Jong Un's official residence, The Supreme People's Assembly, and other important political and military institutions are located in Pyongyang.

Wartime Operational Control

A phrase used to denote which organization or institution has control over a country's military operations during war. Most countries have full control over their own militaries, but South Korea's situation is slightly different.

When South Korea goes to war with North Korea, the president must declare at least DEFCON 3, and by definition, wartime operational control is given to the Combined Forces Command, which the US Forces Korea leads. In simpler terms, wartime operational control is given to the US Military.

Democratization

The process in which a political regime becomes democratic. Historically, this has happened with protests, coups, movements, and more.

Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)

The ruling political party in North Korea. Also the only political party in North Korea. All other political parties, with the exception of the WPK's bloc parties, are considered terrorist organizations in North Korea. Kim Jong Un is the Chairman of the WPK– since the WPK is the only party in North Korea, he is also the supreme leader of North Korea.

Korean People's Army (KPA)

The official militant branch of the WPK. Since the WPK is the only political party in North Korea, the KPA is essentially the military of North Korea.

General Political Bureau (GPB)

Organization of both the KPA and WPK headquarters– basically the North Korean equivalent of the ministry of defense, but with significantly more power. The GPB has the most direct influence on military actions and the commander of the GPB is often referred to as the most powerful person in the North Korean military (Second most powerful person in North Korea). The commander is currently Jong Kyong Thaek, who started the coup.

Fun fact: In the Korean Drama “Crash Landing on You,” the male protagonist (played by Hyunbin) is the son of the Commander of the GPB.

Ministry of State Security- DPRK

North Korean equivalent of the Military Police– this group deals with all military crimes, from investigation to trial. Of course, investigation and trial work differently in North Korea. As a former agent would say, “It’s a place where even dead people open their mouths.” The Ministry of State Security has the power to arrest anyone without a warrant and execute any punishment.

Historical Background

History of North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, also referred to as North Korea, is an East Asian country located in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. Its capital is Pyongyang and its official language is Korean. The country is bordered by China, Russia, and South Korea. The population is approximately 25 million, consisting of predominantly ethnic Koreans. North Korea has been a one-party state led by the Kim family since its establishment in 1948. Its current leader is Kim Jong-un.

Post-World War II, Korea was divided into two zones. The Soviet Union supported North Korea while the United States assisted South Korea. When the Korean War (1950-1953) ended in an armistice, it left the Korean Peninsula divided, still at war. North Korea, similar to its benefactor, adopted a totalitarian dictatorship while South Korea embraced a democracy much like the United States.

North Korea has a state-run economy with key industries including crafting military products, metallurgy, textiles, food processing, and mining. Unfortunately, economic conditions are challenging, with widespread poverty and reliance on international aid.

Regarding freedom and rights, North Korea is widely criticized for its human rights record, including severe restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and movement. The regime maintains strict control over its citizens, completely controlling the media and information released to the public so that it aligns with propaganda glorifying the Kim family.

In terms of international relations, North Korea's main allies are China and Russia. The country maintains very tenuous connections with the vast majority of nations, however, particularly due to its nuclear weapons program and missile tests. Their pursuit of nuclear weapons is a focal international concern that has led to global sanctions. Despite international condemnations, North Korea continues to develop and test its missiles, claiming that it is for self-defense.

Kim Jong Un

Kim Jong Un has been the Supreme Leader of North Korea since 2011 and is speculated to have been born on January 8, 1983 (1982, 1984) though it has not been confirmed by the North Korean government. He is the third successor of the Kim family, after his grandfather and father, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, respectively. Subsequent to his leadership, he has consolidated his power within the country and has significantly advanced North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The majority of Kim Jong Un's early life is unknown, yet he is thought to have spent several years abroad in Switzerland and attended military school before he was publicly named as his father's successor in 2009. After his father, Kim Jong Il's death in 2011, he became the Supreme Leader.

During his reign, Kim is surmised to have executed high-ranking officials, including his uncle Jang Song-thaek, and is widely believed to have been responsible for his half-brother Kim Jong Nam's death in 2017. He is often depicted as a strict and ruthless yet powerful leader.

Internationally, Kim Jong Un has engaged in diplomatic efforts, including summits with numerous presidents and officials from various nations, mainly with South Korea, the United States, China, and Russia. Although these meetings initially suggested hope for a potential thaw in international relations, no lasting agreements on denuclearization or reunification have been made thus far.

The 6th Corps Coup Attempt in North Korea (1995)

In 1995, the North Korea's 6th Corps, headquartered in Chongjin, Hamgyong Province initiated a military coup to overthrow Kim Jong-il's government. This event, although not widely known, led to significant ramifications within the country. The main actor behind the coup was the 6th Corps' political officer who spread the fire of the rebellion to battalion commanders and local administrative leaders, including officials from the State Security Department and the Ministry of Social Security. Most of the regional military and political leaders participated, accentuating widespread discontent.

The coup involved sending special forces to seize key locations such as Kim Jong-il's office, the central broadcasting station, and the military. This strategy involved drawing South Korean and U.S. forces into the Rason area while the 6th Corps' special forces took on Pyongyang. Eventually, the coup was uncovered through the extensive use of foreign currency in organizing the plot because it raised suspicions. The 6th Corps commander, Kim Young-chun, was unaware of the plot and later assisted in its suppression. The North Korean military and security responded by executing and sending hundreds of people to political prison camps.

As a result, The 6th Corps was disbanded, and its units were replaced and relocated. This severe crackdown demonstrated the regime's intolerance for dissent and the extent of internal opposition. This event not only had expedient repercussions but also served as a reminder of the challenges faced by Kim Jong-il's regime. It also emphasized the existence of significant dissent and the potential for further uprisings.

Current State of Affairs

In 2026, the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea is submerged in an unparalleled state of political turmoil in the wake of a brazen coup attempt against the regime of Kim. The SPA, long viewed as no more than a rubber-stamp institution, has now been thrust into the center of an intricate struggle for power, one that may well recalibrate not only the country's future but quite possibly the geopolitics of East Asia.

Kim Jong Un was the supreme leader who enjoyed absolute power, but he was spectacularly knocked off the seat of authority. Forces of coup, under the leadership of Commander Jong Kyong Thaek of General Political Bureau, successfully kidnapped Kim Jong Un, but this most daring act did not bring comprehensive control over the governmental machinery. This leads to a fragmented state where different faction groups fight for the top power, claiming their legitimacy and exerting authority over other sectors of the power structure of North Korea.

The formerly monolithic Korean People's Army, under his control, has now broken into division. Kim Jong Un-controlled special units remain loyal to the deposed leader, while other large parts of the military have turned themselves over to the coup leaders. What emerges is a deeply divided loyalty within the military establishment, with almost an assured dangerous possibility of internal armed conflict.

Adding another layer of complexity to the unfolding drama is the unexpected player Kim Han Sol, the nephew of Kim Jong Un. Unlike other coup leaders who take a hardline stand and want North Korea to retain its militant posture, threatening to start a conflict with South Korea, Kim Han Sol belongs to a more moderate faction. His gradual transition towards a more open and democratic North Korea has been internally and internationally stated, creating another pole within the current power struggle.

On the other side of the conflict, those supporting forces of Kim were fighting hard; Kim Yo Jong was one such force, among others who were staunchly loyalists of him to try to sustain Baekdu Bloodline's hold on power. The monumental task they face is to organize this support without the complete apparatus of the state, which they had previously commanded. In addition, their chores are also encumbered by the necessity of acting in a semi-clandestine fashion since they can no longer refer to the widespread surveillance and control systems which earlier guaranteed their predominance.

This developing crisis keeps the international community in a state of high vigilance, mixing concern with strategic interest. For China, North Korea's traditional ally, the act of balancing is very fragile. Although Beijing values stability on the Korean Peninsula, the possibility of more moderate governance by someone like Kim Han Sol could accord better

with their long-term interests. Russia, another key actor, would most probably consider how such a power shift may influence its strategic standing in East Asia.

The relations between South Korea and the United States are precarious. On one hand, reunification and even the hope of a more cooperative regime in North Korea create tantalizing possibilities; on the other hand, the prospects for chaos or armed conflict are equally sobering. Arguably, North Korea's nuclear arsenal has raised global security concerns to unprecedented heights.

While Japan is not directly a party to this crisis, it nonetheless watches with bated breath, aware that any sudden change in North Korea may have far-reaching consequences for regional security dynamics. Other nations within the region, such as Mongolia and a host of Southeast Asian countries, are equally watching with keen interest, knowing full well that the outcome of this crisis could reshape diplomatic and economic relationships across East Asia.

The people themselves, for the most part, remain in the dark about the political crisis within North Korea. State media reportedly continues to carry on with the appearance of normalcy, but the cracks are beginning to show. Rumors, much like whispers of change, have begun to circulate in Pyongyang and other major cities. The population feels the uncertainty in the air, tensions that some largely just hope will bring about cautious goodness, while others fear instability and hardships.

The power struggle, with its new challenges, weighs heavily on an already strained economy from years of sanctions and mismanagement. Reports said food staples have started running short in some regions while others saw an upsurge in goods that were in scarce supply earlier as control over distribution networks weakened.

So, in that sense, the Supreme People's Assembly has transformed from a symbolic body into a significant platform at which these competing factions must face off against each other. Delegates arriving at this session will be facing the key task of trying to find a way out of this crisis. Every decision in the SPA may change North Korean history, regional stability, and even global security dynamics.

The world holds its collective breath as the fate of the Korean Peninsula hangs in the balance. The real threat of internal conflict, international intervention, and nuclear escalation makes the proceedings all too chillingly real. Now, the SPA delegates find themselves in the unique position of actually having real power to shape their nation's future– a responsibility that offers an opportunity along with grave risk.

Stances of Parties

North Korea - Pro Kim

Kim Jong Un

Supreme leader of the DPRK. Is under threat due to the ongoing coup. The coup forces could not capture him, but his wife and children are captured.

Number one driving factor for Kim's actions should be for him and the Baekdu Bloodline to stay in power. He can consider seeking help from other countries to exert diplomatic/military pressure on the Coup forces.

Kim Yo Jung

Kim Jong Un's sister, Deputy Department Director of the DPRK. Currently on the top of the hierarchy for Kim Jong Un's successor. She also wants to keep the Baekdu Bloodline in power.

Ri Yong Gil

Commander of the Korean People's Army (총참모장, chong-cham-mo-jang). Is considered third in North Korea's political power rank, just below Jong Kyong Thaek. Although his title makes it seem like he has full control over the KPA, but most of the key forces and units (especially ones in Pyongyang) are under direct control of the General Political Bureau.

In short, he has a lot of forces and artillery under control, but nowhere near Pyongyang.

Ri Chang Dae

Minister of State Security (보위상/bo-wi-sang). The Ministry of State Security (보위부/bo-wi-bu) is the North Korean equivalent of the military police. He decided not to join the coup forces because he has a bad relationship with Jong.

Pak Pong-ju

Senior North Korean politician who has served as Premier of North Korea and is a member of the Politburo. He is considered a key economic policymaker and a supporter of Kim Jong Un's leadership.

Choe Son Hui

Choe Son Hui has been at the heart of North Korea's diplomatic operations, especially regarding nuclear negotiations. She fronts for a hardline posture against perceived threats from the United States and South Korea while emphasizing dialogue toward securing interests. Were there a coup or internal instability in perspective, Choe might promote international relations as a means of strengthening Kim Jong Un's regime and the Baekdu bloodline's legitimacy.

O Kum Chol

O Kum Chol plays an important role in the ideological control of the military. He would most likely support Kim Jong Un's leadership and be devoted to promoting loyalty among the troops. In light of the potential threats from coup forces, what O would stress is indoctrination efforts to reinforce the allegiance to the regime and its leaders. The focus would lie on making sure that the military units are under strict control and configured toward the interests of the Baekdu bloodline.

North Korea - Coup

Jong Kyong Thae

Commander of General Political Bureau. Is considered second in North Korea's political power rank. He is also the head of the coup forces and started this coup with other North Korean generals that want to overthrow Kim.

Kim Han Sol

Kim Jong Un's nephew. His father was assassinated. He claims (with support from intelligence) that Kim Jong Un assassinated his father. He is currently protected by an unspecified country's government. He has decided to conditionally support the Coup forces—while the majority of the coup forces want to be more hostile towards South Korea, Kim Han Sol wants to democratize North Korea. He will help the coup forces during the process of the coup (overthrowing Kim Jong Un) but cooperate more with the international leaders afterwards.

Kim Yong-chol

Senior military officer and diplomat who has been involved in high-profile negotiations with the United States and South Korea. He is considered a key figure in Kim Jong Un's administration.

Choe Ryong-hae

Top military official and a member of the Politburo, Choe has been a close ally of Kim Jong Un. However, in the volatile political environment of North Korea, even high-ranking officials can quickly become threats if they are perceived to be gaining too much influence or power.

Ri Yong-ho

Former foreign minister who was removed from his position in 2020. While his removal might not directly indicate opposition, changes in high-ranking positions often correlate with internal power struggles.

Kim Pyong-il

Son of Kim Il-sung and half-brother to Kim Jong Il, he spent many years abroad as a diplomat and returned to North Korea in 2019. His return to the country could potentially position him as a figure of dissent, given his long absence from the central power dynamics.

Others (invited)

Xi Jin Ping

President of China who has strong alliances with North Korea. He publicly claims that he supports Kim's regime. However, he has secret agreements with the coup forces to send Chinese troops if they need support during a war. (Intelligence reports state that North Korea has a pro-china and anti-china bloc, with Kim being anti-China. Of course, nobody in North Korea publicly states that they are pro or anti-china.)

Vladimir Putin

President of Russia who has strong alliances with North Korea. He does not want any war to break out because Russia is already having a war with Ukraine. He wants to prevent the coup forces from taking over (because they will start a war) but also cannot send Russian troops to fight the coup forces (because that is also a war).

Donald Trump

President of the USA. He does not want the coup forces to take over. He is also facing a dilemma similar to Putin's. The US military is definitely capable of getting rid of the coup forces, but American public opinion is against military intervention, especially because China is on the coup forces' side. As the white house previously stated, "confrontation between the US military and Chinese military would lead to World War 3."

Paul J. LaCamera

Current commander of the United Nations Command and ROK/US Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea. If a war breaks out with North Korea (or the coup forces), he will have wartime operational control. He is also against the coup forces because the coup forces are willing to start a war.

Han Deok Soo

Current prime minister and acting/interim president of South Korea. He has close alliances with members of NATO. He is against North Korea in general, but he is against the coup forces in North Korea because the coup forces may be willing to start a war. Ultimately he is facing the irony of having to protect Kim Jong Un. His approval ratings are record low, as Korean citizens do not want to live with the threat of war.

Minister Jang, ROK Minister of Defense (Fictional)

Jang is the South Korean Minister of Defense. He was appointed recently, after the previous defense minister resigned due to the martial law incident. He has command over the South Korean military, but with the current situation, the wartime operational control is given

to the US Forces Korea. He is known to be hardline against North Korea. He would, no doubt, support increased defense measures on the part of South Korea in case anything in North Korea hurts regional security. In case a coup occurs, he might support the use of the situation diplomatically or militarily, depending upon how this can go along in consolidating South Korean interests.

Antonio Guterres

Guterres has never missed a good opportunity to push for diplomatic solutions to conflicts involving North Korea. He always brings in the humanitarian element and calls on all parties to come for dialogue. In case of a coup or instability in North Korea, Guterres would likely call for international cooperation to address humanitarian needs while discouraging military intervention but instead encouraging peaceful resolution. His stance would be neutrality but aimed at regional stability.

Shigeru Ishiba

Ishiba has also argued that Japan needs to bolster its defenses against the threats from North Korea. In the event of a coup in North Korea, he would likely support the furtherance of military preparedness in Japan and the consideration of deeper security relationships with key allies such as the United States and South Korea. He would place emphasis on the preparation of Japan for the eventuality of political changes in North Korea and the fallout from these changes impacting the regional security dynamic.

Kim Yong Ho (ROK Minister of Unification)

Kim Yong Ho adopts a hardline approach towards North Korea, viewing it as an existential threat. He has publicly stated that he believes unification can only occur after the downfall of Kim Jong Un's regime. In light of a coup, he might advocate for South Korea to strengthen its defense posture and leverage this instability to pursue policies that could further isolate North Korea.

Possible Solutions

Negotiating a Power-Sharing Agreement

The most obvious way is through negotiations conducted between the competing factions within the Supreme People's Assembly. These would be diplomatic negotiations aimed at finding a power-sharing formula or interim government made up of the coup forces and pro-Kim factions. The negotiations could be mediated by neutral parties inside the SPA or international observers. This would look toward minimizing violence while retaining stability, with a gradual transition in the exercise of power.

International Intervention and Mediation

Another avenue could be that of drawing upon the influence of the international community to mold the crisis's outcome. Coordinated, multipronged diplomacy will be called for by the regional key players: China, South Korea, and the United States. The international actors may promise incentives for cooperation, like economic aid or security guarantees, in return for commitments toward denuclearization and political reforms.

Democratic Transition Under Kim Han Sol

Another radical solution would be to support a complete overhaul of the North Korean political system and, in doing so, perhaps back Kim Han Sol's vision for a more democratic North Korea. The approach addresses the root causes of the long-standing problems that have persisted due to the breakdown of the current power structures and the allowance for democratic reforms to take hold. This can be a truly transformative solution but would also most likely meet fierce resistance from entrenched interests within the North Korean elite.

Restoration of the Kim Jong Un Regime

On the other extreme, a stability-at-all-costs solution may be the support for restoring Kim Jong Un's regime. It would prevent chaos and further regional destabilization at the expense of political reform. It could be in the form of negotiations with coup leaders to release Kim Jong Un in exchange for probably some conciliatory concessions to cater to the grievances that led to a coup.

Military-Led Interim Government

Another option is a military-led caretaker government. Such a solution would acknowledge the balance of power in the country at the moment, and the military would play the central role in governance. This could take the form of either a rotating leadership among key military figures or possibly the appointment of a neutral military head acceptable to both sides.

Questions to Consider

1. How would the factions within the Supreme People's Assembly weigh their varied interests against those of national stability and the people's welfare in North Korea?
2. To what extent should international actors be involved, and how can such involvement be managed in a way that does not undermine North Korean sovereignty or further escalate tension?
3. Given these different solutions, each of which would involve power-sharing, international mediation, democratic transition, the restoration of Kim's rule, or military interim government, how would each of these options work out with respect to North Korea's relations with its neighbors and the international community?
4. What measures would be taken to ensure the security and proper management of North Korea's nuclear arsenal during this period of political instability?
5. How would the Supreme People's Assembly weigh the current humanitarian needs of the North Korean people against the political struggle for power?
6. What are some policy steps that could be taken now to deter coups and create greater stability in the future for the political régime in North Korea?

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