JejuMUN XII

BACKGROUND GUIDE

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Regulating the rapid development and potential use of autonomous aerial weapon systems in Western Europe

SDG: 16: Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions | 17: Partnership to Achieve the Goals

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Committee Introduction

The Disarmament and International Security Committee(DISEC) was established in 1945 with the foundation of the United Nations. At the point where the immense destruction of WWII in numerous countries, with recognition of the urgent need for a solution to prevent any future wars and to maintain long-lasting peace, the United Nations was formed. To reflect the top priority of the United Nations, the DISEC was designated as the First Committee of the General Assembly of the UN, with all 193 UN member states participating. With UNODA supporting the development of disarmament measures and promoting disarmament efforts, the DISEC committee has actively collaborated with UNODA since 1998.

The committee's central focus is on promoting international security through disarmament. Current global issues, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, are constantly addressed in DISEC. The committee also focuses on addressing newly developed weapons or technologies, such as cybersecurity threats, weapons in space, autonomous weapons systems, and aerial weapons, to prevent any possible conflicts in the future. The Outer Space Treaty, Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT), and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC), which was supported by DISEC, reflect the efforts of the committee to promote international disarmament.

As the development of weapons mounting advanced new technology that may cause mass destruction accelerates, DISEC's role in the international community becomes even more vital. Though DISEC does not have the official authority to sanction or endorse military interventions to individual countries, it contributes heavily to preventing countries from engaging in arms races by encouraging the establishment of disarmament agreements. Non-forceful actions, including raising awareness about the risks of emerging advanced weapons and the need for responsible governance, play a vital role in DISEC's work to achieve global peace.

Agenda Introduction

Autonomous aerial weapon systems are military devices defined by two main characteristics: they can operate while airborne and do not require meaningful human input to apply lethal force. In simpler terms, they are unmanned aircraft that can detect, select, and kill humans without a human operating them. They are distinguished from more conventional weapon systems, such as mines, by the fact that they are 'active'. Unlike mines, which need to be triggered by an enemy to operate, autonomous aerial weapon systems need to make 'decisions' on whether a potential target is a military individual or a civilian—and should a robot make a mistake, it could cost the life of a non-combatant individual.

Autonomous weapon systems can be subdivided further based on the degree of freedom they have. A popular classification divides them into three categories as follows: "Human *in* the loop", "Human *on* the loop", "Human *out* of the loop". The first refers to a weapon system that may or may not identify a target, but requires a human to confirm or initiate action in order to use lethal power. This class refers to everything from an ordinary pistol to a fully human-operated drone with an object detection interface. The second refers to an automated system that acts independently, but requires human supervision, and allows a human to override the controls and abort the action being taken. The majority of autonomous weapon systems being developed today belong to the second class. The third class is a fully autonomous weapon system that can actively detect and kill humans regardless of human supervision or control, and does not have an abortion mechanism.

With the recent hype in artificial intelligence, a new generation of autonomous weapons is both in development and in plans. As lethal autonomous weapon systems are controlled by an on-board computer, as opposed to a human, they effectively use an algorithm to determine which humans get to live, and which must die. There is a general consensus among international communities that algorithms and machines do not have the ability or the moral justification to determine matters of human life, due to their inability to comprehend the value of human life. Further, the fully mechanical nature of the weapons allows for relatively cheap mass production. Along with the reduced moral cost of deployment and relative dispensability of the weapons when compared to human soldiers, fully autonomous weapon systems threaten global security by destruction at an unprecedented scale, yet with a precision comparable to that of human forces.

Autonomous weapon development is occurring at an alarming pace, especially in developed countries that possess the advanced technology required for the development of LAWS. Among the most prevalent leaders in this sector is Western Europe. While many countries within Western Europe have also expressed their concern or strong opposition to the development of LAWS, it nonetheless remains the spearhead of LAWS technology, partly owing to its general technological advancement. It is essential that regulations are put in place to keep LAWS at bay, and by being the first to enforce substantial measures, Western Europe could lead the rest of the world into a world where no machine is given the right or duty to weigh a human life.

This committee aims mainly to provide guidelines and restrictions on the further development, stockpiling, and deployment of autonomous aerial weapon systems of any and all kinds. Delegates are tasked with producing a resolution that appropriately sets regulations for autonomous aerial weapon systems, as well as proposing solutions for the monitoring and enforcement of these regulations.

Letter from the Chairs

Dear delegates,

Welcome to JejuMUN XII's DISEC committee! We are delighted and honoured to serve you as your chairs for the upcoming iteration of JejuMUN. The agenda this year is interesting; autonomous aerial weapon systems, often called by the somewhat more self-explanatory name "killer drones," are a rapidly emerging threat to global security in a myriad of different aspects, ranging from peace to ethics. At the forefront of modern military technology, autonomous aerial weapons systems bring both the menace of the violation of the laws of war, as well as the potential promise of a battlefield without human soldiers. Additionally, the focus of this conference lies not on the battlefields themselves, but rather in the centre of innovation. By addressing the site of the gestation of modern technologies—and therefore modern munitions, we hope this conference will help you see modern issues in peace from a new perspective.

Message from the Head Chair:

I am Benjamin, a Year 12/Grade 11 from NLCS Jeju. It is my greatest honour to serve as the Head Chair of DISEC. Looking back, I realise just how transformative MUN as an activity—and more importantly, as a community, was for me. Whether you are a delegate fresh from the MUN 101 class or a grizzled and decorated veteran of MUN, I will do everything in my power to make this experience as amazing for you as it was for me. Please, do not hesitate to reach out to me or my co-chairs if you find yourself doubting your next step at any point—we will be beyond delighted to help you through the process, perhaps even learning something ourselves. I wish all of you the best of luck—let's make this the best JejuMUN yet!

Message from Deputy Chair

I am Hyojin (Josephine) Choi, a freshman at NLCS Jeju. I am honored to serve as your Deputy Chair of the DISEC committee. Throughout the conference, I hope to foster active discussions and creative approaches addressing the rapid development and potential use of autonomous aerial weapon systems in Western Europe according to your country's policies. To make a productive conference, I highly recommend that you conduct thorough research on past actions of your designated country, enabling you to contribute more effectively and come out with even higher-quality resolutions. I am looking forward to watching your passionate speeches in the upcoming JEJUMUN XII.

Message from Associate Chair

Hello Delegates! I am Layla Park from NLCS Jeju and currently in Year 11! It's a pleasure to be serving you all as your Associate Chair. I joined the MUN community a little over a year ago, and I've witnessed what I believe to be the most thriving collective of innovators, persuasive speakers, and motivated people in the GEC! With the twelfth annual JejuMUN commencing soon, I highly encourage all to utilise this opportunity to showcase your skills in negotiation and

diplomacy and take the opportunity to foster strong relationships with the people who share your passion for thoughtful discussion and action. I sincerely hope this committee and our agenda can broaden your horizons and allow you to skillfully develop crucial soft skills and social abilities, while remaining a memorable experience for all! Feel free to send an email to any of the chairs for any questions you may have. I hope to see you all soon!

Best regards,

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Key Terms

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, also known as LAWS, refer to the whole class of weapons that have a computer algorithm sensor equipped, which makes it capable of selecting its target and destroying it without humans in control. Currently, countries including the United States of America, South Korea, China, Russia, Israel, and the United Kingdom are developing the aforementioned weapons.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs), commonly known as drones, refer to an aircraft that does not have a human on board. It is increasingly used for military purposes due to its high-accuracy strikes and low risk of pilot casualties.

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence(AI) refers to a set of technologies that makes computers capable of advanced functions such as the collection and analysis of data. Artificial Intelligence is increasingly being equipped in weapons for the purpose of enhancing accuracy.

Meaningful Human Control

Meaningful human control is a political principle that humans must maintain enough control and oversight over autonomous weapon systems. This concept emphasizes the importance of preserving human judgment, ethics, and morals in risk situations, including warfare.

Proliferation

Proliferation in this agenda refers to the spread and increased development of technologies or weapons in nations or informal groups.

International Humanitarian Law

International Humanitarian Law(IHL) refers to the set of rules that limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons. This is developed through the establishment of treaties that are formally agreed upon by states.

Dual-Use Technology

Dual-use technology refers to all technologies that could be used in both civilian and military purposes. In this agenda, Artificial Intelligence and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are examples of dual-use technology, as it is used in both commercial and military sectors.

Just War

Just war is the concept of military conflicts between nations being ethical. This concept highlights the importance of waging the war with principled intentions.

Autonomy Spectrum

Autonomy spectrum refers to the range showing the degree of human control over a system; it ranges from none to full autonomy in weapon systems.

Accountability Gap

Accountability gap refers to situations where it is difficult to assign responsibility for an action or result. The use of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons contributes to the creation of an accountability gap by limiting human autonomy, making it difficult to determine who is accountable for the unintended or unlawful humanitarian harm.

Historical Background

The historical background can take multiple forms, for instance, a chronological timeline or a descriptive paragraph. Still, this part should include the following:

Context/cause:

The first recorded instance of autonomous aerial weapon systems was in 1849, when Austria used unmanned air balloons to attempt to bomb Venice. In the following century, autonomous aerial weapons continued to be developed: radio-controlled aircraft to attack Zeppelins in 1917, early cruise missiles and drones in 1929, target drones developed in 1938, and hundreds of iterations and improvements during the Cold War. These systems only continued to grow more powerful and devastating as time marched on.

To many nations, the possibility of a battle in which no national soldiers are sacrificed is a tempting one. As such, militaries from around the world aimed to gain this new technology and utilise it in their own wars, to varying degrees of success.

For the discussion of autonomous aerial weapon systems in Europe specifically, the Russo-Ukrainian War is a prime example. Drones have been used since the beginning of the conflict as a multi-purpose tool for reconnaissance, ground support, and precision strikes. As both sides have used lethal autonomous weapons, their use has become normalised within the Russo-Ukrainian War. In reaction to the use of these weapons, countries have had varying reactions. NATO members such as Germany and France have condemned Russia's large-scale drone attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, in instances such as the drone attack on a Kharkiv maternity hospital, resulting in nine injuries and damage to critical infrastructure. Nordic and Baltic states such as Finland and Sweden have begun development on autonomous aerial weapon systems of their own, in response to the possible threat of a Russian attack.

Past actions:

In 2004, the UK incorporated the MBDA Storm Shadow into its military. The cruise missile was designed with the ability to autonomously recognise targets, confirm, and engage pre-programmed targets. The MBDA Storm Shadow was also adopted by France and Italy, with similar capabilities.

In the 2010s, the EU began efforts to regulate drone use in Europe. One of the earliest instances was in 2014, with the European Commission's 'Call for Action' regarding civil drones and safety, data protection, and liability for autonomous aerial vehicles. Although this commission did not address the use of drones in combat situations, it set into motion Europe's awareness of drones and their emerging potential for damage.

In 2013, Spain's INTA SIVA, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) became fully operational with flight capabilities. INTA SIVA units were to be used as reconnaissance technology and have successfully been operated by various branches of the Spanish military. Though this UAV has not been used in active combat, its development for surveillance purposes expresses the growing interest in defensive UAVs in Europe.

In 2020, the EU formally adopted drone regulations through the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945. This addressed operational regulations, risk-based categorisation, certification requirements, and other security requirements. Once again, though this did not directly address the usage of drones with combat in mind, it still made efforts to keep drones registered, regulated, and as safe as possible for civilian use.

Beyond these examples, autonomous aerial weapon systems, including loitering munitions, swarming AI-enabled munitions, hypersonic stealth systems, and more, exist throughout Europe, especially the West, with nations like the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Norway, and Spain having implemented these systems for around a decade in most instances. Many of these systems have minimal or no human control, seen in the French "Larinae" operating based on preset parameters and independently operating final launch controls. FCAS "Remote Carriers" in use by France, Spain, and the UK are not overseen by human operators during flight, with cruise missiles such as Norway's Joint Strike Missiles actively including a 'fire-and-forget' AI system with no active human control.

Current State of Affairs

The UN has expressed strong disapproval of lethal autonomous weapons systems of all kinds. The United Nations Secretary General António Guterres has deemed such systems 'politically unacceptable and morally repugnant'. Guterres has called for a binding legal agreement to ban all development, stockpiling, and deployment of lethal automated weapons systems. This is a view shared by many disarmament organisations around the world, including the Human Rights Watch and the EU. Recent years have also seen the rise of several Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which advocate for the banning of autonomous weapon systems, among the most prominent of these being the *Stop Killer Robots* movement.

As of June 2025, over 14,000 drone strikes have been launched by the United States of America alone, predominantly in Afghanistan, alongside Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen. These strikes caused anywhere from 1000 to 2000 civilian deaths, with an estimated maximum of 450 children killed. There is debate regarding whether such civilian deaths were intentionally allowed in the design of the weapon systems or if they were genuine errors, but it is very clear that autonomous weapon systems provide little or no improvement from the conventional weapons controlled by humans in terms of accuracy in target selection and the sparing of civilians. A notable phenomenon is that semi-autonomous or fully controlled unmanned weapon systems, mostly in the form of short-ranged drones, have led to a massive increase in civilian casualties, going so far as to surpass conventional explosive weapons on several occasions. This is almost undoubtedly caused by the intentional targeting of civilians; while this does not suggest a fault in the engineering itself, there have been speculations that the remote nature by which these robots are controlled could have led to their controllers feeling less moral inclination towards ethical practices; essentially finding it easier and potentially even being inclined to target unarmed civilians.

Proponents of the technology suggest that AI-powered weapon systems will be more accurate at target identification than human soldiers, and that robot warfare will reduce human casualties. It is worth noting, however, that the current performance of the AI has proven to fall short of human decision-making, and that there are cases where drone designers are willing to intentionally allow the drones to target civilians.

The US alone has invested a total of over 20 billion dollars in the development of autonomous weapon systems, and nearly double that amount in the development of drones in general. At least 12 countries have invested in the development of autonomous weapons systems for use in their military, and this interest and growth of the market is expected to be sustained or increased in the future.

Stances of Parties

Brazil

Brazil stands against Lethal Autonomous Aerial Weapon Systems (LAWS), finding them in contradiction to international human rights. Brazil encourages human oversight over any drones used in warfare and advocates for treaties to be made regarding LAWS and their usage. Brazil has manufactured domestic unmanned drones, but emphasises human control over the weapons.

People's Republic of China

China stands for LAWS, but still encourages regulation and standards in its usage. China advocates for discussion on a legally binding protocol, especially regarding the classification of "Acceptable LAWS" and "Unacceptable LAWS" in relation to international human rights. China promotes discussion via the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and encourages multilateral consensus-building within the CCW's Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). China aims for partial human control over all LAWS, with 'human in the loop' and 'human on the loop' levels of control being priority. China supports using LAWS for peaceful and security purposes, allowing the AI to be developed in hopes of beneficial results.

Ecuador

Ecuador stands against LAWS. In a meeting for the CCW in 2024, Ecuador condemned allowing LAWS to make potentially fatal decisions as "unacceptable". Ecuador has called for the halt of LAWS manufacturing and a prohibition of non-human-managed drones globally.

Egypt

Egypt stands against LAWS, firmly supporting the CCW and similar regulations regarding LAWS, especially encouraging the presence of human oversight and the prohibition of algorithms in making lethal decisions. However, Egypt has been reserved regarding newer bans on LAWS, aiming to take a balanced approach to safety and emerging technologies.

Estonia

Estonia stands for LAWS, refraining from outright bans on LAWS while supporting some human oversight. Estonia's stance generally aligns with NATO and the EU, focusing more on accountability and transparency on LAWS and LAWS regulations, and maintains flexibility in its stance.

France

France stands for LAWS. France often initiates and engages in CCW discussions and encourages further expanding existing frameworks and human rights regulations, as seen in the 2019 political declaration with Germany regarding the application of human rights laws to LAWS. France discourages a preemptive ban on LAWS and the newly emerging field of technology it represents, citing potential benefits to AI development, reducing human casualties in conflicts, and more. France advocates for risk assessment and control over

sweeping prohibitions on LAWS, favouring precise definitions and regulations to be developed in the forthcoming discussions.

Germany

Germany advocates for a complete and legally binding ban on all autonomous weapons systems that are completely independent from human control. Germany emphasises how LAWS violates international regulations on human rights and considers fully autonomous weapons unacceptable. In 2017, Germany explicitly warned against LAWS and their future use in live combat against human targets.

Iraq

Iraq stands against LAWS, heavily emphasising humanitarian concerns and protection of human rights as issues regarding LAWS usage. Iraq calls for a full ban on LAWS in combat scenarios. Iraq aligns itself with the Arab Group in calling for preemptive bans on legislation on LAWS.

Israel

Though Israel has not made an explicit public statement on its stance toward LAWS, their opposition on preemptive bans on autonomous weapons shows its favorable stance toward LAWS. Confirmed aspects of their stance from the 2019 CCW GGE include affirming the CCW is an appropriate forum for discussing the topic, advocating for some degree of human oversight on the autonomous systems, and recognising potential benefits such as less risk of human casualties if LAWS were to be used in combat scenarios. Moreover, Israel has been actively developing autonomous weapons such as the Harpy and Harop drones, which are designed to autonomously detect and attack key enemy infrastructures since the 1980s, continuing to operate LAWS in the present day.

Japan

Japan stands somewhat against LAWS, prioritising universal definitions regarding LAWS and developing human control over fully autonomous drones. Japan takes a stance of non-proliferation and regularly participates in CCW meetings.

Libya

Libya has not shown strong positions outlining its stances on LAWS. As a country that does not possess autonomous weapon systems, Libya supports the establishment of an international agreement for regulations on LAWS to prevent misuse or proliferation of LAWS.

Mexico

Mexico stands against LAWS. Mexico primarily advocates for maintaining human control over autonomous weapon systems, as seen in the sponsoring of the 2017 joint statement on an agreement regarding human control over drones. Mexico cites humanitarian concerns and ethical issues as strong reasons for opposition.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Democratic People's Republic of Korea stands for LAWS. DPRK has been implementing autonomous capabilities into weapons systems since around 2023. With continuous flight

tests on ballistic missiles under an autonomous guidance system, DPRK clearly supports military development based on LAWS and weapons under AI systems.

Pakistan

Pakistan stands against LAWS, particularly regardingthe unchecked development of LAWS. Pakistan deeply wishes to prevent an arms race in developed countries for LAWS. Pakistan also calls for legislation to be put into place, and expresses concerns for civilian casualties in fully automated weapon systems, supporting preemptive bans and regularly engaging in CCW meetings.

Palestine

Palestine stands against LAWS, warning of potential war crimes and many probable civilian casualties in ongoing wars. Palestine is especially concerned with human rights issues relating to potential LAWS use in Gaza. Palestine urges an immediate ban on

Poland

Poland believes in the importance of maintaining human control over “kill decisions”. While highlighting the need for human supervision on weapons, Poland opposes preemptive bans on LAWS. Recently, there has been development on autonomous weapons such as FlyEye drones, reflecting their interest in implementing aerial weapons systems. Poland supports the use of existing international frameworks for establishing regulations on the use of LAWS.

Russia

Russia stands for LAWS. Russia states that the current human rights legislation is adequate and is strongly against any new LAWS bans. Russia is actively developing new LAWS, expressing beneficial aspects of LAWS relating to increased precision and reducing the possibility of fatal human error during operation. Russia views LAWS bans as breaches of sovereignty, framing full bans as violations of national defense autonomy. Russia continually blocks many CCW efforts, blocking progress towards formal discussions on complete bans on LAWS. promoting transparency among nations.

South Korea

South Korea stands for LAWS. South Korea aims to balance both domestic security needs and international regulations, prioritising clear definitions regarding LAWS over preemptive bans. South Korea is currently developing LAWS; however, it stresses maintaining human control over said drones.

Switzerland

Switzerland stands against LAWS, stating that LAWS must comply with international human rights and encourages compliance and law-centered approaches to the issue. Switzerland argues for human control, clearer definitions of allowed LAWS, and currently refrains from supporting an all-out ban on LAWS.

Türkiye

Turkey stands against the development of autonomous systems, emphasizing the need for human control and accountability over weapons systems. Therefore, Turkey supports

preemptive prohibition of LAWS as it needs further assessment. Turkey supports developing from the currently existing frameworks rather than establishing a new separate treaty for banning LAWS. However, Turkey has shown investment in AI-implemented defense systems, including the Kemankes-1 autonomous cruise missile recently.

Ukraine

Ukraine stands against LAWS. Ukraine aligns with EU/NATO opinions of preserving human control over all LAWS for ethical considerations, compliance with human rights laws, and reducing the risk of civilian casualties when in use. Ukraine supports international discussions regarding LAWS throughout various platforms, including on domestic, regional, and international levels. Ukraine currently uses human-controlled LAWS in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates stands for LAWS, actively investing in AI and fully autonomous LAWS. The UAE encourages CCW discussion on the agenda, encouraging continued international discussion on the use of LAWS. However, the UAE actively discourages preemptive bans on LAWS, favouring precise regulations over blanket regulations on the newly emerging field of autonomous aerial weapons systems.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom stands for LAWS. The UK opposes preemptive bans on LAWS while maintaining the opinion that human rights and legislation should continue to be adhered to and developed, rather than creating blanket laws against LAWS. The UK mostly focuses on transparency and enforcement of preexisting laws rather than creating new regulations. In terms of development, the UK has stated that all LAWS will have some degree of human oversight at all times, standing against completely autonomous LAWS.

United States of America

The United States stands for LAWS, actively participating in CCW conversations but refusing to support bans on LAWS completely. The US is currently developing LAWS, but makes efforts to maintain human control over the weapons.

Possible Solutions

Given the nature of the agenda, several solutions can be found, each focusing on a different aspect of the proliferation of lethal aerial weapons systems.

The first, and perhaps the most decisive piece of action being called for by a substantial number of member states, is for the total and absolute prohibition of all lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is already being called for by several member states, and is an option to be considered seriously. There are two major factors to consider in the implementation of a full ban on LAWS: the prohibition of its further development and the dismantling of existing stockpiles. The enforcement of such international policies would require a binding legal document outlining three key aspects: the range of weapons considered unacceptable cases of LAWS weapons, a guideline as to the dismantling of stockpiles and prohibition of further research, and a time by which the goals outlined in the document should ideally be achieved.

Another approach that could gain more traction from countries that have already made larger investments in LAWS technology, or are less willing to abandon the technology altogether, is to limit LAWS and its use conditionally. This would take a form similar to that of the first solution, with the main difference being that the terms are less radical, with major exceptions being made. For example, the ban may only be on the deployment of LAWS, as opposed to this occurring in conjunction with their development. Such an approach would be a realistic way to circumvent specific incentives or needs common to the international community.

A final, perhaps most conservative approach may be in the support, in the form of monetary, material, or military support, to any country suffering attacks from types of LAWS considered unacceptable according to specific regulations. Such a solution, while far from a permanent prevention of the unethical use of LAWS on the battlefield, or for the further development of similar technologies, is a way to minimise the damage currently being done in the short term. Since such a solution requires minimal violation of the sovereignty of the offending state, this solution would be easier to implement compared to the earlier two solutions, and could well serve as a temporary, short-term solution to current uses of LAWS, as well as serving to discourage the further use or development of LAWS by demonstrating an actionable opposition against LAWS technology.

Questions to Consider

As the representative of an individual state:

- How much has your country invested in LAWS technology?
- In what ways would a LAWS "fleet" or "swarm" benefit or harm your country's military in times of peace or war?
- What is the public opinion on LAWS in your country?

As a member of an international society:

- What does the distribution of LAWS development across the world today look like?
    - Is there an imbalance? If so, what is its significance?
    - Are these patterns found only in the distribution of LAWS, as opposed to other forms of advanced weaponry?
- Would the extensive use of LAWS benefit or harm the general public? Is an automated battlefield a key to the reduction in human suffering, or would it rather lead to a "manslaughter race"?

From a technological view:

- How reasonable is it to expect global pioneers in engineering to continue developing new technologies while fully circumventing LAWS?
- How accurate are LAWS in target identification today, and how accurate will they be in the future?

From an ethical view:

- Is it moral for a human to be killed by a LAWS? Does death by a LAWS constitute a fate worse than being killed by a human?
- Is it moral to give a machine, assuming it is incapable of comprehending the value of human life, the ability and the right to kill a human?
    - Does your answer change, should a LAWS be superior to the average human soldier, or even perfect, in accurate target detection as well as its adherence to the moral code?
    - Who is responsible if a LAWS causes an unnecessary civilian casualty?
        - Is there a better answer to the equivalent question, where such a casualty is caused by a human? Why is this important?

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