


Committee: 1962 EXCOMM

Delegation: Maxwell D. Taylor



Our country currently faces the biggest threat of nuclear destruction it has ever faced in the form of ballistic missiles placed in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I, Maxwell D. Taylor, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believe this committee should look towards a more forceful and militarized approach to this dire and urgent crisis over any attempts of negotiation and dialogue while maintaining a high level of secrecy with the media.

Due to the urgency of time and unknown true intentions of the USSR's actions, it is critical that the military of the United States of America strikes first. Other diplomatic options serve to be prone to failure or too ineffective. An attempt to incentivize aiding the U.S. for Cuba would simply be too risky. In the case that they reject, the USSR becomes aware of our plans and we lose the element of surprise for any further actions. In addition, the likelihood that they would accept such a bargain is highly unlikely due to rising tensions from the Bay of Pigs Invasion. As for involving the United Nations to negotiate with the USSR, the outcome would not be definitive and absolute enough for American safety.

Military action, if executed properly, would be the quickest and most efficient means of deterring the USSR's nuclear advances, thus the execution should be perfected. I advise that the military carry out an all-inclusive air strike accompanied by a naval blockade on Cuba. Preparations for invasion should also be made in the case that it will be necessary following the airstrikes, and it most likely will be. The reason for an all-inclusive airstrike over a mere surgical strike targeting only the missiles is the immanent retaliation that follows. Leaving aircrafts, ships and tanks, as well as tactical missiles, creates a situation in which the U.S. and Puerto Rico are vulnerable to a counter-attack by Cuba with non-nuclear weapons such as airstrikes. An all-inclusive airstrike would remove these risks in addition to giving us the opportunity to invade Cuba with the element of surprise, whereas a surgical strike followed by retaliation would leave us without it. If the committee fails to execute an all-inclusive strike, I would prefer to take no military option as opposed to the alternative of having a surgical strike. Furthermore, I, as a firm believer of president Kennedy's flexible response defense strategy, do not believe that the U.S. should respond to threats by resorting to the use of nuclear weapons immediately, and we should first utilize non-nuclear options to deter nuclear aggression of the USSR. However, in the case that Cuba does use nuclear arms to fight off the invasion, I am strongly for the use of nuclear weapons to respond. Yes, Cuba's hypothetical nuclear retaliation would result in a heavy loss of casualties on our side, but I believe that if our nuclear response is quick and devastating enough, this loss would be greatly diminished and victory over Cuba would be ours. With this military plan of action, I believe that the nuclear missiles of Cuba will be neutralized and the crisis will be resolved. I look forward to working with the entire committee to achieve such goals,

specifically Dean Acheson, McGeorge Bundy, C. Douglas Dillon, and John McCone, as I believe these committee member's views align with mine and they will favour military action.

Regardless of what decisions this committee does end up making, I believe all should be confidential to the media in that we will not publicly address any actions taken by the committee to any forms of press. As we are the leaders of this country selected by the very people that live in it, it is our duty to make decisions independent from the frenzy of the media in a time like this. Pacifying the media is hardly a concern at this moment of crisis. Updating the people with our committee's progress would leave us prone to leaks that alert our foes and aggravate the situation further. The cost of communication with the public is simply too great as of this moment to pursue. Though the public may become wary and distrustful, that is not our current priority. We shall seek to make amends for the public's support after this crisis has been detained.

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